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Buonocore Porter: Mixed Signals and the ADA

MIXED SIGNALS: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM THE
SUPREME COURT IN THIS POST-ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT ERA?
Nicole Buonocore Porter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008
(ADAAA) was intended to breathe new life into the ADA after the
courts, especially the Supreme Court, drastically narrowed the ADA’s
protected class. But since the ADA was amended in 2008, the
Supreme Court has not decided any ADA cases. Thus, there are many
ADA issues, especially in the employment context, that remain
unresolved. This paper will attempt to determine whether we can
expect a disability-friendly Supreme Court or whether the Court will
once again narrowly construe individuals with disabilities’ rights under
the ADA.
In doing so, I have uncovered some mixed signals. On the one
hand, the body of Tenth Circuit ADA cases decided by our newest1
jurist, Justice Gorsuch, suggests an anti-disability bent. On the other
hand, one possible source of good news for individuals with
disabilities are two disability law cases decided by the Supreme Court
in 2017: Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools and Endrew F. ex rel.
Joseph F. v. Douglas County School District RE-1. Both of these cases
were very plaintiff-friendly and both were unanimous judgments (the
Fry case had a two-justice concurring opinion). But are these plaintifffriendly cases signaling a pro-disability Supreme Court? Or is the
plaintiff-friendly outcome of these cases because they involve
educating children? And if the latter is true, what can we expect from

* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development and Professor of Law, University of
Toledo College of Law.
1 Since the time this paper was drafted, Brett Kavanaugh was appointed to the Supreme
Court. However, this paper does not analyze his disability law jurisprudence.
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the Supreme Court if and when it decides the unresolved ADA
employment issues? This paper will attempt to answer these questions.
Part II will discuss the tumultuous history of the ADA
including: a brief description of the ADA, the courts’ narrow
interpretation of the definition of “disability” under the ADA,
Congress’s expanded definition of disability under the ADA
Amendments Act, and the unresolved ADA issues that might find their
way to the Supreme Court in the near future. Part III will discuss the
mixed signals regarding how the Supreme Court might decide these
unresolved ADA issues, starting with the negative signal—Justice
Gorsuch’s disability law cases while he was sitting on the Tenth
Circuit, before turning to the positive signal—the Supreme Court’s
plaintiff-friendly disability cases in 2017. Part IV will then
hypothesize about what, if anything, these mixed signals mean for the
future of ADA employment cases that could reach the Supreme Court
in the near future.
II.

TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF THE ADA
A.

The Early Days

The ADA was enacted in 1990, with overwhelming bipartisan
support.2 The ADA has several titles. Title I covers discrimination in
employment by all employers who have 15 or more employees.3 Title
II covers governmental services and benefits, including accessibility
of government-funded buildings.4 Title III addresses access to places
of public accommodation—private businesses that are open to the
public, regardless of size.5 Most of the litigation occurs under Title I,
the employment discrimination title.
Title I prohibits employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities.6 There are two features of Title
I that set it apart from other employment discrimination statutes
(specifically, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits

2 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008).
3 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2018) (defining employer to include entities that have 15 or
more employees).
4 Id. § 12131.
5 Id. §§ 12181-12182.
6 Id. § 12112.
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discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin7).
First, only individuals with disabilities are protected.8 Unlike Title
VII, which protects employees regardless of their protected class, there
is no “reverse” discrimination under the ADA.9 Thus, plaintiffs have
to prove they fall into the protected class, i.e., that they have a disability
as defined in the statute. The second major difference10 is that the
ADA reaches beyond simply prohibiting discrimination based on a
disability. It imposes an affirmative obligation on employers to
reasonably accommodate individuals with disabilities unless doing so
would cause an undue hardship.11
It was the first difference—that only those individuals who can
meet the definition of disability can bring a claim under the ADA—
that dominated the case law after the ADA was passed. Specifically,
in a series of four decisions, the Supreme Court decimated the scope
of the Act’s coverage, drastically limiting the number of individuals
who could qualify as disabled. Disability is defined in the ADA as a
“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.”12 In what is known as the Sutton trilogy, the
Supreme Court held that, in determining whether an individual has a
disability, courts should view that person considering any mitigating
measures that ameliorate the effects of the disability.13 Under the facts
7

Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability).
9 Nicole Buonocore Porter, Special Treatment Stigma After the ADA Amendments Act, 43
PEPP. L. REV. 213, 219 (2016).
10 Id. at 219. There is a narrow accommodation obligation for religious practices, but the
burden on employers is pretty minor. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Accommodating Everyone,
47 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 89 (2016) (citing to the statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(j),
that requires accommodations for religious beliefs, as well as the standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977), which only
requires employers to provide accommodations for religious beliefs or practices if those
accommodations do not result in an undue hardship, which the Court defined as anything more
than a de minimis expense).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . . unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation can impose an undue hardship”).
12 Id. § 12102(1).
13 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (holding that fully correctable
myopia is not a disability); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519-21 (1999)
(holding that high blood pressure controlled my medication is not a disability); Albertson’s,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999) (holding that the lower courts should have
considered the plaintiff’s brain’s coping mechanisms as a way of compensating for his
monocular vision in determining whether monocular vision is a disability); see also Nicole
8
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of Sutton, this did not seem very controversial because the Sutton
plaintiffs had fully-correctable myopia, so their impairment was not at
all stigmatizing, and was also very common.14 But this “mitigating
measures” rule led many courts to hold that impairments that many
would consider disabilities do not fall into the protected class.15
The Supreme Court’s final blow to the ADA’s definition of
disability was in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams.16 In this case, the Court held that, in determining whether
an impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, the
impairment must “prevent or severely restrict” the individual from
performing a major life activity, and only major life activities that are
of “central importance to daily life” are included.17 The Court also
held that the impairment must be permanent or long-term.18 This case
caused many individuals to be excluded from the protected class under
the ADA,19 leading many scholars to claim that the courts were
engaging in a “backlash” against the ADA.20
B.

The ADA Amendments Act

Congress was unhappy with this dramatically narrowed
definition of disability and therefore passed the ADA Amendments
Act of 2008.21 This Act (hereinafter the “Amendments” or the
“ADAAA”) did not change the definition of disability but added in
several provisions to help courts correctly interpret the definition.22
Buonocore Porter, The New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2014) [hereinafter
“Porter, Backlash”] (discussing these cases).
14 See Stephen F. Befort, The Story of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Narrowing the Reach
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES (Joel Wm.
Friedman ed., 2006).
15 Long, supra note 2, at 220 (stating that as a result of the mitigating measures rule, many
individuals have been found not disabled under the ADA).
16 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
17 Id. at 196-97.
18 Id. at 198.
19 Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 11.
20 Id. at 13-14. See generally RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST
DECADE OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA
62-97 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, DISABLING
INTERPRETATIONS: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT IN FEDERAL COURT (2005).
21 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2018); Porter, Backlash, supra
note 13, at 14-15.
22 Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 15.
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First, the ADAAA changed the mitigating measures rule from
the Sutton trilogy. The statute now states: “The determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall
be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures . . . .”23 Second, the Court expanded the definition of “major
life activities” and placed the definition in the statute itself, rather than
leave it to the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter “EEOC”) to define major life activity, as had
been the case under the original ADA. The major life activity
provision (with additions from the EEOC’s prior definition in italics)
now states:
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to,
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating,
thinking,
communicating,
and
working.24
Congress also defined major life activities to include the operation of
“major bodily functions,” such as “functions of the immune system,
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”25
Third, Congress did not define “substantially limits” but
instead left it to the EEOC to define, and stated that the EEOC’s
definition should “be interpreted consistently with the findings and
purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”26 In 2011, the EEOC
issued regulations stating that “substantially limits” should be
construed “broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum
extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.” Furthermore, it is not
meant to be a “demanding standard.”27
Fourth, the Amendments state that an impairment that is
episodic or in remission should be considered a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.28 This provision,
in combination with the addition of “major bodily functions,” means

23
24
25
26
27
28

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
Id. § 12102(2)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § 12102(2)(B).
Id. § 12102(4)(B).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2018).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).
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that diseases like cancer, multiple sclerosis, or epilepsy will be
considered disabilities even if they are in remission or even if the
individual is not currently experiencing symptoms from the
impairment.29
Early research seems to demonstrate that courts are heeding
Congress’s wish to interpret the definition of disability broadly.30
C.

Unresolved Issues

Despite the fact that more cases are proceeding past the
coverage inquiry (whether the individual has a disability) and
proceeding to the merits of the case, the Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari on an ADA Title I case since the Amendments went into
effect (on January 1, 2009). Thus, there are several outstanding issues
that the Supreme Court will possibly resolve in the future.
First, the correct causation standard under the ADA is
undecided. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to make clear that an
individual only has to demonstrate that his protected class status was a
“motivating factor” in the employer’s decision, even if other factors
also motivated the employer.31 Many courts applied that “motivating
factor” standard to ADA cases after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, even
though Congress did not specifically amend the ADA with the
“motivating factor” standard.32 But in 2009, the Court held that, under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter “ADEA”), the
“motivating factor” standard does not apply.33 Instead, plaintiffs in an
ADEA case have to prove that their age was the “but-for” cause of the
adverse employment action.34 In 2013, the Court also held that
retaliation cases brought under Title VII (as compared to status-based

29

Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 17.
See Porter, Backlash, supra note 13, at 46-47; Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical
Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
2027, 2050-51 (2013).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
32 See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000); Baird v.
Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029,
1033-34 (7th Cir. 1999); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1076 (11th Cir.
1996); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Buchanan v. City of San
Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301
(8th Cir. 1995).
33 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
34 Id. at 176.
30
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discrimination cases) also have to meet the more stringent “but-for”
causation standard and not the easier “motivating factor” standard.35
After Gross and Nassar, the lower courts began holding that
the proper causation standard under the ADA is the “but-for” causation
standard rather than the more lenient “motivating factor” standard.36
The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue.
Second, there is a current circuit split regarding whether an
employer must offer reassignment as a reasonable accommodation to
an employee with a disability if there are other, more qualified
employees who also applied for the job. This is a different issue from
the one that arose in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,37 where the Court
had to decide whether reassignment to a vacant position should be
granted as an accommodation for an individual with a disability when
a more senior employee had also applied for the vacant position under
a formal seniority system.38 The Court in Barnett held that, ordinarily,
the seniority system should trump, in part based on the legitimate
expectations of non-disabled employees to be treated fairly and
consistently pursuant to the seniority system.39
Courts diverge on the issue of whether Barnett mandates that
an employer reassign a disabled employee over another, more qualified
employee. The Eighth Circuit in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.40 held
that giving the accommodation to the employee with a disability
instead of the more qualified non-disabled employee would amount to
“affirmative action with a vengeance” and therefore does not have to
be granted. In other words, the employer is only required to allow the
disabled employee to compete for the position along with everyone
else.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, but the
parties settled before the case was heard, so the case was dismissed.

35

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
See, e.g., Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 233-36 (4th Cir. 2016)
(holding, in reliance on Gross, ADA discrimination claims require a showing of but-for
causation); Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying
but-for causation standard to ADA claim); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d
957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).
37 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
38
Id. at 403-04.
39 Id. at 405-06.
40 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007).
41 Id. at 483-84; see also United States EEOC v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 842 F.3d 1333,
1345-47 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the ADA does not require reassignment over a more
qualified coworker).
36
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On the other side are courts which hold that only allowing the
employee with a disability to compete for a vacant position is not an
accommodation at all, because the ADA’s non-discrimination
provision already requires that employers allow individuals with
disabilities to compete on an even playing field with non-disabled
coworkers.42 Most recently, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Barnett
by noting that, with a seniority system, coworkers have the expectation
of receiving fair and uniform treatment under the seniority system. But
under a most-qualified policy, employees do not have an expectation
of being placed in the position, because those decisions are
discretionary unlike the mostly mechanical seniority system
decisions.43 Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari on this issue
once, I expect they will again if the right case comes before them.
There is also a circuit split regarding whether Title II of the
ADA applies to employment discrimination cases brought against
governmental entities. For instance, in Elwell v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,44 the Tenth Circuit
(in an opinion authored by then-Judge Gorsuch) held that plaintiffs
cannot bring employment discrimination claims under Title II of the
ADA; Title I is their only avenue of relief.45 The Seventh Circuit is in
agreement.46
Much earlier, in Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil and Water
Conservation District, the Eleventh Circuit held otherwise, relying on
the legislative history surrounding Title II and the Department of
Justice’s regulations, which specifically state that Title II covers
discrimination in employment and that courts should use the same
rules and standards as Title I of the ADA.47
One of the most commonly litigated issues under the ADA is
whether the employer has to grant a leave of absence as a reasonable
accommodation, and if so, under what circumstances.48 The Court
42

See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Aka
v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
43 EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2012).
44 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012).
45 Id. at 1305; see also infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing this opinion).
46 See Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2013). So is the Ninth
Circuit. See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999).
47 133 F.3d 816, 821-25 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
50 F.3d 1261, 1264 (4th Cir. 1995) (implicitly assuming plaintiff could sue for employment
discrimination under Title II).
48 See Lawrence P. Postol, ADA Open Issues: Transfers to Vacant Positions, Leaves of
Absence, Telecommuting, and Other Accommodation Issues, 8 ELON L. REV. 61, 62-63 (2016)
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recently denied certiorari on this issue,49 but I don’t think that can
necessarily be read as suggesting that they would never grant certiorari
to resolve this debate.
There is also a circuit split on the issue of whether courts should
grant compensatory and punitive damages under ADA retaliation
cases (as compared to ADA discrimination cases).50
Finally, although not a formal circuit split, there is a debate
about how courts should address intra-class discrimination issues. For
instance, if an employee with bipolar disorder is passed up for a
promotion in favor of an employee who uses a wheelchair, can the
employee with bipolar disorder sue for disability discrimination? And
more broadly, how should courts decide these issues of intra-class
discrimination.51
This is not necessarily an exhaustive list but merely an attempt
to highlight some of the most obvious issues that I believe the Court
could and perhaps will address in the near to mid-term future. A
completely separate question, to which I turn next, is how the current
Court will decide these issues. To answer this, we need to explore
some mixed signals.

(stating that the issue of when and under what circumstances an employer has to provide a
leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation is an open issue under the ADA). See
generally Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439 (2002).
49 See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476, 481-82 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding
that a long-term leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018).
50 Compare Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., 588 F.3d 1261, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2009)
(holding that compensatory and punitive damages are not available for ADA retaliation cases),
Bowles v. Carolina Cargo, Inc., 100 F. App’x 889, 890 (4th Cir. 2004) (same), Kramer v. Banc
of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 963 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 932 (2004) (same),
and Collazo-Rosado v. Univ. of P.R., 775 F. Supp. 2d 376, 388 (D.P.R. 2011) (same), with
Foster v. Time Warner Entertm’t Co., 250 F.3d 1189, 1196-98 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming
award of compensatory damages in an ADA retaliation case without a thorough discussion),
Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 315 (2d Cir. 1999) (same), EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999) (same), Edwards v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., LLC, 390
F. Supp. 2d 225, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that compensatory and punitive damages are
available for ADA retaliation cases).
51 See generally Jeannette Cox, Disability Stigma and Intraclass Discrimination, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 429 (2010) (discussing various issues of intra-class discrimination); Nicole Buonocore
Porter, Cumulative Hardship, G. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing how courts
should address intra-class discrimination issues).
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MIXED SIGNALS

This Part will first address what I consider to be the negative
signal—specifically, the fact that Justice Gorsuch authored several
anti-disability rights cases while on the Tenth Circuit. I will then turn
to the positive signal, which is that the 2017 Court decided two
plaintiff-friendly disability cases, albeit in the education context rather
than the employment context.
A.

Justice Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit Opinions

I will address then-Judge Gorsuch’s disability opinions while
on the Tenth Circuit in chronological order. The first is Johnson v.
Weld County, Colorado,52 where the court addressed the issue of
whether the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis was a disability under the preAmendments ADA.53 The plaintiff was an accountant who had
multiple sclerosis.54 She was temporarily placed into the position of
Fiscal Officer while the employer was preparing to hire a permanent
replacement.55 When the employer finally began hiring for a
permanent fiscal officer, the plaintiff applied, along with other
employees.56 Ultimately, the employer hired a non-disabled man for
the job.57 When the male employee was hired, the plaintiff was tasked
with training him.58 She complained to human resources about this,
which subsequently led to her experiencing retaliation.59 She
eventually brought a lawsuit that included several claims, but for
purposes of this paper, I will only address the disability claim.
This case applied pre-ADAAA law regarding the definition of
disability because the Amendments did not apply retroactively and the
facts of this case occurred in 2005,60 several years before the ADAAA
became effective. The plaintiff argued that her multiple sclerosis

52

594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1206-07. The case also dealt with a sex discrimination issue but that will not be
discussed here.
54 Id.
55
Id. at 1207.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
53
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substantially limited her in the major life activity of working.61 But
because the evidence suggested that she was a “highly competent
employee” and had “excellent performance reviews,” the court held
that she was not substantially limited in working.62 The court
recognized that it is likely that her multiple sclerosis would progress to
the point where it would interfere with her ability to work, but it had
not yet.63 Thus, the court used the evidence the plaintiff had introduced
to help buttress her claim that she should have received the promotion
instead of the able-bodied man it hired, in order to hold that she was
not disabled, and therefore did not fall into the protection of the ADA
at all.64 Even if she had been in possession of convincing evidence that
the employer did not want to hire her for the job because it worried
about her being too disabled in the future to perform the job well or
because it did not want to provide her any accommodations that she
might have needed in the future, the court would not have considered
that evidence because it held that she did not even fall into the
protected class.65
The court also dismissed plaintiff’s claim that she was disabled
under a “regarded as” argument—that the employer regarded her as
being substantially limited in a major life activity.66 Her evidence was
that she was told that the decision maker “didn’t hire her as Fiscal
Officer because she was a woman and had multiple sclerosis, and so,
in his view, she couldn’t handle the stress of the position.”67 The court
refused to consider this argument because it was “inadmissible
hearsay.”68
The next case that then-Judge Gorsuch authored was Elwell v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.69
This case addressed the issue of whether state employees can bring
employment discrimination claims against their state employers under

61

Id. at 1218.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 I do not mean to suggest that this move is unique to this case. Several courts in the preAmendments era held that plaintiffs were not disabled and therefore did not fall into the
protected class without ever reaching the merits of their cases. Porter, Backlash, supra note
13, at 11-12.
66 Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1219.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 693 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2012).
62
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Title II of the ADA (which applies to government services) or whether
their only avenue of relief is under Title I.70 Taking a methodical
approach through the statutory text of Title II, including the catch-all
language contained in the main anti-discrimination section of Title
II—“or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity”—the court
found that Title II was not intended to apply to employment
discrimination claims.71
This holding might not seem very important given the
protection of Title I for employment discrimination claims. However,
Title I has administrative exhaustion requirements, and more
importantly, the Supreme Court has held that states enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit under Title I, which represents an
obstacle for state employees trying to bring employment
discrimination claims.72 As I mentioned earlier, this is one of those
issues for which the circuits are split. It seems likely to me that, if this
issue were decided by the Supreme Court, not only can we predict how
Justice Gorsuch would rule on it, but the fact that he authored one of
the circuit’s opinions leads me to suspect that he might be able to
persuade other justices to side with him on this issue.
Perhaps the most troubling of Judge Gorsuch’s Tenth Circuit
disability cases is Hwang v. Kansas State University,73 where the court
had to deal with the issue of when a leave of absence is a reasonable
accommodation.74 This case was brought under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, rather than the ADA, but in most circumstances,
courts interpret the statutes consistently.75 Gorsuch started the opinion
appearing sympathetic, noting that “Grace Hwang was a good teacher
suffering a wretched year.”76 She was a college professor who was
diagnosed with cancer and needed treatment. She was given a sixmonth leave of absence, but when that leave ended and her doctor
advised that she was not capable of returning, she asked for more time
off.77 The university responded that it had a strict policy of not

70

Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1307-10.
72 Id. at 1310 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001)).
73
753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014).
74 Id. at 1161 (“Must an employer allow employees more than six months’ sick leave or
face liability under the Rehabilitation Act? Unsurprisingly, the answer is almost always no.”).
75 See, e.g., Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106, 133 (D. Mass. 1997).
76 Hwang, 753 F.3d at 1161.
77 Id.
71
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allowing more than six months of sick leave, and therefore, it refused
to give her more leave, effectively resulting in her termination.78
The court was quick to dismiss the idea that an additional leave
of absence might be a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the court
stated: “It perhaps goes without saying that an employee who isn’t
capable of working for so long isn’t an employee capable of
performing a job’s essential functions—and that requiring an employer
to keep a job open for so long doesn’t qualify as a reasonable
accommodation.”79 Judge Gorsuch did recognize that sometimes an
employee who needs a “brief” absence can “still discharge the essential
functions of her job” or that “allowing such a brief absence may
sometimes amount to a (legally required) reasonable accommodation
so that the employee can proceed to discharge her essential job
duties.”80 But then the court stated that “it’s difficult to conceive how
an employee’s absence for six months—an absence in which she could
not work from home, part-time, or in any way in any place—could be
consistent with discharging the essential functions of most any job in
the national economy today.”81
The court refused to rely on the EEOC enforcement guidance,
which states that employers should provide employees with additional
unpaid leave unless doing so would cause an undue hardship.82 The
court misinterpreted the EEOC Guidance83 and then stated that there is
no evidence that the employer’s inflexible policy in this case was
discriminatory.84
The next ADA employment case then-Judge Gorsuch authored
was Myers v. Knight Protective Service, Inc.85 In this case, the
plaintiff, at a place of prior employment, had suffered a workplace
injury and obtained social security disability benefits as a result.86
Around the same time, the plaintiff applied for a job as an armed

78

Id.
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 1162.
81 Id. (stating “[e]ven if it were, it is difficult to conceive when requiring so much latitude
from an employer might qualify as a reasonable accommodation.” (emphasis in original)).
82 Id. at 1162-63.
83
Id. at 1163 (stating that the EEOC Guidance does not answer the question of when a leave
of absence would be reasonable and only applies after a court determines that additional leave
would be reasonable).
84 Id. at 1164.
85 774 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2014).
86 Id. at 1248.
79
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security guard with Knight Protective Service.87 As part of that
application, he was asked several questions about his physical
condition and he alleged that he suffered no relevant disabilities.88
Soon after, one of his supervisors noticed that plaintiff seemed to be in
pain, and upon questioning, plaintiff admitted that he had a number of
neck and back surgeries and that he experienced recurring pain. As a
result, plaintiff was told that he could not work without passing a
physical examination. Plaintiff waited for the employer to schedule
the exam, and when that did not occur, he believed he was terminated
and he filed suit.89 The district court dismissed all of his claims.90
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal stating that the
plaintiff was not qualified for his position.91 The court gave deference
to the employer’s written employment application, which indicated
that the essential functions of the job as a security guard were to engage
in “frequent and prolonged walking, standing, and sitting; to react
quickly to dangerous situations; to subdue violent individuals; and to
lift heavy weights.”92 The court found that the plaintiff was not
qualified to perform these functions in large part because in his
representations to the Social Security Administration, the plaintiff
conceded that he was “in pain all the time, could stand for only twenty
minutes, and could walk for just ten or fifteen minutes.”93 The Tenth
Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court had previously held in
Cleveland v. Policy Management System Corp.94 that when a plaintiff
makes seemingly inconsistent statements in proceedings before the
Social Security Administration and in the ADA lawsuit, that the
plaintiff should be given an opportunity to provide a sufficient
explanation for the apparent contradiction.95 In one sentence, without
elaboration (despite the fact that this is a published opinion), the court
stated: “That [(providing the explanation)] Mr. Myers has failed to
do.”96

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1248-49.
Id. at 1249.
526 U.S. 795 (1999).
Myers, 774 F.3d at 1249 (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 805).
Id. at 1249.
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Without knowing more about the job or what the plaintiff
alleged in his briefs to the court, it is unclear to me whether the plaintiff
attempted to offer an explanation for the apparent inconsistency. Most
often, the explanation turns on whether there are reasonable
accommodations that would allow the plaintiff to perform the job. I,
of course, do not know much about the duties of a security guard, but
one relevant question would be whether the plaintiff could successfully
perform the job if accommodated. Possible questions for determining
if he could have been reasonably accommodated might include:
whether the plaintiff worked with another security guard; if so,
whether that other security guard could assist if the plaintiff needed to
apprehend someone; whether it would be possible for the plaintiff to
sit on a stool for part of his shift; and whether it would be possible to
structure the “rounds” a security guard makes so as to minimize the
amount of walking he would have to do. I have no idea whether any
of these would be feasible, but in my limited experience with security
guards, their main function is often meant to be one of deterrence and
observation, rather than actually chasing or apprehending anyone.
Some of the accommodations I have suggested might have allowed
him to perform his job successfully. Certainly, it is possible that both
the district court and the Tenth Circuit considered these possible
accommodations. If so, it would have been helpful to include this
discussion so that the wisdom and precedential value of the case could
be analyzed. Without it, I find problematic the court’s failure to
explore whether accommodations would have allowed him to perform
his job successfully.
The final disability employment case authored by then-Judge
Gorsuch was Lancaster v. Sprint/United Management Co., which is an
unpublished opinion.97 Without any details being provided about the
facts of the case, the court noted that the district court had initially
entered a default judgment on the plaintiff’s behalf because the
employer did not respond to her complaint in a timely manner.98
However, this default judgment was vacated because the plaintiff
failed to meet her burden of showing that she had served process on
Sprint’s authorized agent.99 In addressing her ADA failure-toaccommodate claim on the merits, the Tenth Circuit stated that she was
not entitled to a reasonable accommodation because the only
97
98
99

670 F. App’x 984 (10th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
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accommodation that she sought was “an extended, indeterminate leave
of absence,” which the court held was not a reasonable accommodation
as a matter of law.100
Even though I have only covered the opinions that were
employment cases, I was unable to find any disability-related opinions
that then-Judge Gorsuch authored that were decided in the plaintiff’s
favor.101 This alone does not bode well for plaintiffs in disability cases.
But more importantly, Justice Gorsuch has issued opinions against
plaintiffs in two of the circuit splits I identified above; whether
plaintiffs can bring employment discrimination claims under Title II
and whether leaves of absence are reasonable accommodations under
the ADA.
Moreover, in his apparent desire to be brief and pithy, his
opinions leave the reader wanting more explanation regarding the facts
and the court’s reasoning. It is almost impossible to ascertain any of
the relevant facts from reading his opinions alone. The reader would
have to turn to the district court opinions. Thus, it would be difficult
to determine whether an opinion would be a relevant precedent for an
individual case without delving more deeply into the lower court
opinions. This will be frustrating to lawyers and researchers.
B.

The Supreme Court’s 2017 Disability Opinions

The Supreme Court decided two disability-related opinions in
2017 that are friendly to disability plaintiffs and their interests: Fry v.
Napoleon Community Schools and Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v.
Douglas County School District RE-1.
1.

Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools102

In Fry, the Court addressed a relatively narrow issue of
exhaustion of remedies. Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (hereinafter “IDEA”),103 public schools have to provide
a “free appropriate public education” (hereinafter “FAPE”)—which
consists of special education and related services—to all children with
100

Id.
See, e.g., Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917
(10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claim by a residential treatment facility that denial of
a variance to allow it to operate in a public motel was not discriminatory).
102 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
103 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2018).
101
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disabilities.104 Because parents and schools sometimes do not agree on
whether an appropriate education is being provided to a particular
child, the IDEA establishes formal procedures (a multi-step process)
for resolving disputes—this process is referred to as “exhausting
remedies.”105 But the IDEA is not the only federal statute that applies
to children with disabilities and the schools they attend—plaintiffs can
also file suit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act or
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which both broadly prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities (children and
adults) in all kinds of settings, as long as those settings are public
entities (for purposes of Title II) or a program or activity that receives
federal financial assistance (for purposes of Section 504).106 These
statutes require covered entities to provide reasonable modifications to
existing practices to allow the individual with a disability to participate
in those programs or activities.107
The plaintiff in this case, E.F., was a child with a severe form
of cerebral palsy, affecting her motor skills and mobility.108 Her
parents, upon the recommendation of her pediatrician, obtained a
trained service dog for her, a goldendoodle named Wonder, who
assisted E.F. by helping her with various life activities, including
“retrieving dropped items, helping her balance when she uses her
walker, opening and closing doors, turning on and off lights, helping
her take off her coat, [and] helping her transfer to and from the
toilet.”109 When the Frys sought permission for Wonder to attend
kindergarten with E.F., the school refused, arguing that because E.F.’s
Individualized Education Program (hereinafter “IEP”) provided for a
human aide and one-on-one support, Wonder was superfluous.110
Later that year, the school briefly allowed Wonder to attend school
with E.F., but the dog was required to stay in the back of the classroom
and could not assist E.F. with many of the tasks he had been
specifically trained to do.111 The school administrators subsequently

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id. at 751 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
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barred Wonder completely from the classroom, and the Frys removed
E.F. from the school and began home-schooling her.112
The Frys filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (hereinafter “OCR”), arguing that
the school’s exclusion of Wonder violated E.F.’s rights under Title II
of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.113 The OCR
agreed, explaining that a school’s obligation goes beyond providing
educational services, and includes not discriminating against a child.114
In response to OCR’s decision, the school agreed to allow Wonder to
attend school with E.F., but the Frys were worried that the school
would resent E.F. and decided to find her another school.115 The Frys
also filed suit in federal court, alleging that the school failed to
reasonably accommodate E.F.’s use of a service animal.116 The district
court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss, stating that the
Frys were required to first exhaust their administrative remedies under
the IDEA.117 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that because the
injuries alleged by E.F. are “educational” in nature, the Frys first had
to exhaust their remedies under the IDEA.118 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.119
The Court first noted that the Sixth Circuit erred in holding that
the Frys must exhaust remedies under the IDEA if the injury is
educational in nature.120 Instead, the Court held that the IDEA’s
exhaustion requirement is only applicable to relief that is available
under the IDEA and the only relief that can be sought under the IDEA
is the denial of a FAPE.121 Thus, the exhaustion rule “hinges on
whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a free appropriate public
education.”122
The Court then turned to the next step in the analysis—
determining whether the plaintiff is seeking relief for the denial of a

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 753.
Id.
Id. at 754.
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FAPE.123 The Court stated that, in answering this question, the court
should look at the substance (or “gravamen”) of the complaint.124 The
exhaustion requirement will apply if the plaintiff’s complaint seeks
relief for the denial of a FAPE, and in making this determination,
courts should not simply consider specific terms or labels used by the
plaintiff; but rather, should look to the substance of the complaint.125
One clue, according to the Court, for determining whether the
gravamen of the complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE or instead
addresses disability-based discrimination is to ask two hypothetical
questions.126 First, could the plaintiff have brought the same claim if
the conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school, such
as a public library?127 Second, could an adult at the school (an
employee or a visitor) have brought the same claim that the child
did?128 If the answer to both of these questions is “yes,” then the
complaint is not alleging a denial of a FAPE.129 Ultimately, the Court
remanded to the court below to address the proper question—(what is
the gravamen of E.F.’s suit) which is a different question from the one
the Sixth Circuit had asked (whether the claim was “educational” in
nature).130 Despite the remand, the Court strongly suggested that the
gravamen of the suit was not the denial of a FAPE because the Frys
have all along admitted that the school district satisfied E.F.’s
educational needs.131 The Court also noted that the Frys could have
brought this same suit against another type of governmental entity
which had refused to admit E.F.’s service dog.132
Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice
Thomas joined.133 Although the concurring justices agreed with most
of the opinion, they disagreed with the “clues” offered in the majority
opinion to help courts decide these cases—specifically whether the
student could have brought the same suit against another public
institution and whether an adult could have brought the same claim
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759.
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against the school.134 Justice Alito stated that these clues are not
helpful because the statutes involved have overlapping protections.135
Although the reach of this opinion is small (because the issue
was narrow), it is still seen as a pro-plaintiff suit. E.F. and her parents
have the right to sue the school district for denying E.F. the right to
bring Wonder, the service dog, to class.
2.

Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas
County School District RE-1136

In Endrew F., the Court had to revisit an issue left open from
1982, when it had first discussed the applicable standard for
determining what constitutes a “free appropriate public education.”137
In Rowley, the issue was whether the IDEA’s FAPE requirement
obligated the school district to provide Amy Rowley with a sign
language interpreter.138 The Court in Rowley took a middle road in
determining the standard governing whether a school district has met
its obligations of providing each student with a disability a FAPE. The
Court held that the IDEA “guarantees a substantively adequate
program of education to all eligible children.”139 This requirement is
satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational plan that is
“reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits.”140 When a child is receiving her education in the regular
classroom, a FAPE is being provided if the IEP is “reasonably
calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance
from grade to grade.”141 Because Amy Rowley was advancing from
grade to grade in a regular classroom without the use of the sign
language interpreter, the Court determined that the school district’s
obligation to provide a FAPE had been met.142
The question not answered by the Court in Rowley, however,
was how courts determine if a FAPE is being provided when the child
134

Id.
Id.
136 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
137 Id. at 993. See also Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
138 Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994.
139 Id. at 995 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-02).
140 Id. at 996.
141 Id. (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204).
142 Id. (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202).
135
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is not being educated in the regular classroom. That issue arose in
Endrew F. Endrew F. had autism, which qualifies as a disability under
the IDEA.143 Endrew attended school in Douglas County School
District from pre-school through fourth grade.144 Each year, an IEP
was prepared to address his educational and functional needs.145 In
fourth grade, his parents became dissatisfied with Endrew’s
progress.146 They believed his academic and functional progress had
stalled.147 His IEP mostly contained the same goals and objectives
from the prior year, indicating to his parents that he was not making
meaningful progress towards his goals.148 When the school district
presented another IEP that Endrew’s parents thought was substantially
similar to the previous year, they objected, removed him from public
school, and enrolled him at a private school that specialized in
educating children with autism.149 Endrew did much better at the
private school in part because the school developed a behavioral
intervention plan that identified strategies for addressing his biggest
problem areas.150 The private school also increased his academic
goals, and he soon was making academic progress that he had not
achieved in public school.151
After six months at the private school, the public school
presented another IEP to Endrew’s parents but they again rejected it,
claiming it was too similar to his old IEP despite the fact that his
experience at the private school suggested that he would benefit from
a different approach.152
After exhausting their administrative
remedies, Endrew’s parents sued the school district for failing to
provide Endrew a FAPE.153
The Administrative Law Judge who first heard the case denied
154
relief. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.155 The district

143
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146
147
148
149
150
151
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153
154
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 997.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court acknowledged that Endrew’s performance “did not reveal
immense educational growth,” but it concluded that the changes made
to Endrew’s IEP objectives were “sufficient to show a pattern of, at the
least, minimal progress” and this was all that was required under the
standard announced in Rowley.156
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.157 That circuit had long interpreted
the language in Rowley requiring “some educational benefit” as
meaning that an IEP will be considered “adequate as long as it is
calculated to confer an ‘educational benefit [that is] merely . . . more
than de minimis.’”158 Under this standard, the Tenth Circuit held that
Endrew’s IEP was calculated to enable him to make “some progress”
and therefore, he had not been denied a FAPE.159
Before the Supreme Court, the school district argued that the
IEP does not need to provide any particular level of benefits as long as
it allows the child to achieve some educational benefit.160 The district
relied on the Rowley Court’s refusal to set any particular standard as
evidence of its position.161 The Court disagreed, pointing primarily to
the fact that the Court in Rowley had no need to define the particular
standard because the case before it involved a child whose progress of
advancing from grade to grade affirmatively established that the IEP
was designed to deliver “more than adequate educational benefits.”162
The Court also noted the inconsistency between the district’s argument
that the Rowley Court had set a substantive standard that any
educational benefit was enough when the Rowley Court made clear that
it was not setting a particular standard for testing the adequacy of the
educational benefits received.163
The Court then announced not a precise standard but a general
approach: “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a
school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to
make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”164
Although the Court made clear that the question should be whether the
IEP was reasonable rather than whether it is ideal, it also stated that
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999.
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the “IEP must aim to enable the child to make progress.”165 The Court
stated that this standard reflects the “broad purpose of the IDEA,”
which is an “ambitious” piece of legislation.166 And, a “substantive
standard not focused on student progress would do little to remedy the
pervasive and tragic academic stagnation that prompted Congress to
act.”167
The Court reiterated what it had said in Rowley, that when the
preference for mainstreaming is met, “the system itself monitors the
educational progress of the child” by making sure the child is receiving
“passing marks” and advancing “from grade to grade.”168 But the
Court had no need in Rowley to opine on what is appropriate progress
when a child is not reasonably going to be able to achieve grade-level
advancement.169 For those students, the Court said, the educational
program “must be appropriately ambitious in light of his
circumstances, just as advancement from grade to grade is
appropriately ambitious for most children in the regular classroom.
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet
challenging objectives.”170
The Court recognized that this standard is not a “formula” but
also noted that it is “markedly more demanding” than the “merely more
than de minimis” standard used by the Tenth Circuit.171 A student
offered an educational program only aimed at merely more than de
minimis “progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been
offered an education at all.”172 The Court came to a unanimous opinion
in this plaintiff-friendly case.
IV.

FUTURE OF ADA TITLE I CIRCUIT SPLITS?

After exploring the mixed signals above, the open question is
what the combination of Justice Gorsuch’s addition to the bench and
the pro-plaintiff 2017 opinions means for the future of some of the

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1001.
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ADA issues that might come before the Supreme Court in the near
future.
Unfortunately for disability rights advocates, I do not think that
the picture is rosy. Despite the pro-plaintiff 2017 opinions, my reading
of those cases is that they are not pro-disability so much as they are
pro-education of children. There is some language in the Fry and
Endrew F. opinions that emphasizes the importance of children’s
education. For instance, at one point in the Endrew F. opinion, the
Court states that the “focus on the particular child is at the core of the
IDEA.”173 And the Court in Fry describes the IDEA as “important”
for children with disabilities.174
More importantly, these plaintiff-friendly cases are likely not
indicative of a disability-friendly Supreme Court because they both
involved questions of statutory interpretation under the IDEA, which
is a very different statute from the ADA.
The IDEA provides a substantive mandate for educational
benefits, whereas the ADA is primarily an anti-discrimination
statute.175 Even though the ADA requires employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities, courts
have long been skeptical about the ADA’s accommodation mandate.
For instance, Judge Posner, in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department
of Administration,176 said this about the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation obligation:
The more problematic case is that of an
individual who has a vocationally relevant disability—
an impairment such as blindness or paralysis that limits
a major human capability, such as seeing or walking. In
the common case in which such an impairment
interferes with the individual’s ability to perform up to
the standards of the workplace, or increases the cost of
employing him, hiring and firing decisions based on the
impairment are not “discriminatory” in a sense closely
analogous to employment discrimination on racial
grounds. The draftsmen of the Act knew this. But they
173

Id. at 999.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017).
175 Id. at 756 (“In short, the IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services,
while Title II and § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] promise non-discriminatory access to
public institutions.”).
176 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
174
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were unwilling to confine the concept of disability
discrimination to cases in which the disability is
irrelevant to the performance of the disabled person’s
job. Instead, they defined “discrimination” to include
an
employer’s
“not
making
reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee . . . .”177
Compared to what some see as hostility towards the reasonable
accommodation obligation under the ADA,178 the IDEA’s provision of
substantive benefits, as part of Congress’s power to legislate under the
spending power,179 stands on firmer footing. Because Congress
provides federal funding in exchange for the states’ agreement to meet
the provisions of the IDEA,180 the substantive obligation to provide a
FAPE is very broad. For instance, in Cedar Rapids Community School
District v. Garret F.,181 the Court held that the IDEA does not contain
an “undue burden” exemption even though the costs of the medical
services needed by a ventilator-dependent student were very high.182
The Court concluded:
This case is about whether meaningful access to the
public schools will be assured, not the level of
education that a school must finance once access is
attained. It is undisputed that the services at issue must
be provided if Garret is to remain in School. Under the
statute, our precedent, and the purposes of the IDEA,
the District must fund such “related services” in order
to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated
into the public schools.183
177

Id. at 541-42.
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (1996) (“Reasonable accommodation is
affirmative action, in the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual’s
disabilities and to provide special treatment to him for that reason.”).
179 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 204 n.26 (1982).
180
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017) (“An eligible child . . . acquires
a ‘substantive right’ to such an education once a State accepts the IDEA’s financial
assistance.” (citation omitted)).
181 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
182 Id. at 77-78.
183 Id. at 79.
178
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In contrast to the broad interpretation the Court has given to the IDEA,
it has not interpreted the ADA broadly.184 I think it is unlikely that two
plaintiff-friendly IDEA cases are going to change the Court’s
interpretation of disability rights under the ADA.
Finally, given that disability plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit lost
in every case penned by then-Judge Gorsuch, his addition to the Court
is likely bad news for disability rights advocates. More specifically,
he has taken employer-friendly positions on two of the issues for which
there are currently circuit splits—whether a plaintiff can sue for
employment discrimination under Title II and whether an employer
has to provide a long-term leave of absence as a reasonable
accommodation.185
All of this leads me to believe that if and when any of the circuit
splits identified above186 are heard by the Supreme Court, they are not
likely to lead to disability-friendly outcomes.

184 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1999) (holding that
plaintiffs with fully correctable myopia are not disabled because disability must be determined
considering any mitigating measures); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 519-20
(1999) (holding that plaintiff’s hypertension is not a disability because medication helps to
mitigate it); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that, in
determining whether plaintiff’s monocular vision is a disability, the court must consider any
coping techniques the plaintiff’s brain uses to accommodate his vision impairment); Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (narrowly interpreting the meaning of
“substantially limits” and “major life activities”); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002) (holding that the employer’s seniority system trumps the disabled employee’s right to
be reassigned to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation).
185 See Elwell v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303 (10th
Cir. 2012); Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2014).
186 See supra Part III.A.
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